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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISORY ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-11186 
GERMANTOWN CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
RONALD H. SINZHEIMER, ESQ. (PETER J. MOLINARO of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
WHITEMAN OSTERMAN & HANNA (6UNTER DULLY of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Germantown 
Central School District (District) to a decision by the Assistant 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Assistant Director). The Administrative Supervisory Association 
(ASA) has filed a charge against the District in which it alleges 
that the District violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) when it subcontracted the services 
previously performed by its cafeteria manager, Elaine Banks, to 
Quality Food Management, Inc. (QFM). The Assistant Director's 
decision issued after a hearing pursuant to our remand of the 
Assistant Director's earlier decision.-f The Assistant Director 
found a violation of the Act as alleged. 
^24 PERB 53023 (1991), remanding 23 PERB f4605 (1990). 
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The District appeals essentially the entirety of the 
Assistant Director's decision, renewing most of the arguments and 
defenses which were rejected by the Assistant Director. It 
argues that the charge, as amended, is untimely, that Banks' work 
was not subcontracted because it had previously abolished its 
cafeteria program and staff under an austerity budget,-7 that no 
violation can be found because ASA did not demand to bargain, 
that ASA either waived its right to bargain or should be estopped 
from proceeding with its charge and that the Assistant Director 
incorrectly excluded proof regarding certain statements which 
were made at the pre-hearing conference on the charge. 
ASA argues that the Assistant Director's decision is correct 
in all material respects and should be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and the parties' arguments, 
including those made at oral argument, we affirm the Assistant 
Director's decision. We discuss many of the District's arguments 
on appeal only briefly because we agree with and adopt the 
Assistant Director's disposition of the District's several 
defenses. 
The charge concerns the transfer to QFM of work previously 
done by Banks. Her termination in June 1989 is irrelevant to 
that charge except as it affects the appropriate remedy. The 
work was transferred by subcontract entered into with QFM no 
earlier than July 18, 1989. The charge was filed and amended 
-
;The subcontract of the cafeteria operation itself is not 
contested under this charge. 
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within four months of that date. As such, we have no need to 
consider whether the amendment relates back to the date the 
charge was first filed. 
Although the District was privileged to abolish its 
cafeteria program unilaterally, an austerity budget neither 
requires nor authorizes the continuation of that program through 
subcontract of unit work in violation of the Act. We reject the 
District's argument that Banks' service could not have been 
subcontracted in violation of the Act because she had been 
terminated before the contract with QFM was entered. To accept 
the District's argument would permit it and all other public 
employers to avoid any bargaining duty regarding a decision to 
transfer unit work simply by timing the transfer to take effect 
at a time after the unit employees have been removed from their 
jobs.-' Furthermore, the District's argument ignores that the 
violation turns on the transfer of bargaining unit work, not the 
loss of any individual's position. 
We also reject the District's argument that the absence of a 
bargaining demand is fatal to ASA's charge. ASA's charge is 
grounded upon unilateral action, not a refusal to bargain 
pursuant to demand. The District's unilateral subcontract of 
unit work is itself a per se rejection of the bargaining process 
-''in affirming the Assistant Director's conclusion in this 
respect, we do not decide that work once exclusive to a unit 
remains forever unit work even if there is a prolonged disruption 
in the delivery of the service by unit employees. In this case, 
Banks' termination and the subcontracting of her services were, 
essentially, contemporaneous events. 
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and a refusal to bargain. No demand to bargain is necessary in 
such circumstance.-7 A demand to bargain is necessary only to 
those §209-a.l(d) allegations which are grounded upon a refusal 
to bargain pursuant to a specific demand. A refusal to bargain 
premised upon a unilateral change in a mandatory subject of 
negotiation is a violation of the Act separate from a refusal to 
bargain pursuant to demand.-7 Moreover, in the circumstances of 
this case, a demand to bargain the decision to subcontract Banks' 
services would in all likelihood have been unavailing because the 
District was committed to continuing the cafeteria program 
through QFM substantially unchanged from when that program was 
operated by the District.-7 
Our decisions in Schenectady County Community College-7 
(Schenectady) and County of Rensselaer,-7 (Rensselaer) cited by 
the District, are not to the contrary. Those decisions involve 
only an analysis of waiver defenses and they remain persuasive 
only to whatever extent they are consistent with the later-
^Wappinger Cent. School Dist. , 19 PERB J[3037 (1986) ; County of 
Cattaurauqus, 8 PERB f3062 (1975). 
^Incorporated Village of Rockville Centre. 18 PERB [^3082 (1985) ; 
County of Schenectady and Sheriff, 18 PERB [^3038 (1985) . 
-
7The addition of a school breakfast program did not alter the 
District services in a manner or to an extent which would permit 
the District to subcontract Banks7 work, the qualifications for 
which were not changed on transfer to QFM. 
7
-'e PERB J[3027 (1973) . 
&8 PERB H3039 (1975). 
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decided case of CSEA v. Newman.g/ Properly understood and 
limited, Schenectady and Rensselaer have no application to the 
necessity for a bargaining demand as a condition to a unilateral 
change cause of action. 
The absence of a bargaining demand is similarly unhelpful to 
the District's waiver or estoppel defenses. The District never 
intended to nor did involve ASA as a bargaining agent in any of 
the discussions involving its budget or the subcontract of the 
cafeteria operation and ASA's spokesperson did not participate in 
those discussions in his capacity as an agent for ASA. 
The District's equitable estoppel defense is rejected 
because we find no reliance by the District in making its 
decision to subcontract with QFM upon any actions or statements 
which the District would attribute to the ASA. We find no 
evidence that the District was induced to contract with QFM by 
any word or deed of the ASA. Rather, we find, as did the 
Assistant Director, that the District intended to maintain a 
cafeteria operation by subcontract with QFM and never involved 
any ASA spokesperson in any discussions about subcontracting. 
The extent of ASA members' involvement was to participate in 
discussions about the scheduling of a breakfast program under QFM 
after the decision to subcontract had been made. Any claim that 
ASA waited too long to object to the subcontracting is not 
2/88 A.D.2d 685, 15 PERB 57011 (3d Dep't 1982), appeal dismissed. 
57 N.Y.2d 775, 15 PERB [^7020 (1982). 
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persuasive because it filed its charge within the short period of 
time allotted under our Rules of Procedure. 
The proof which was rejected by the Assistant Director 
involved statements made by ASA's counsel during the pre-hearing 
conference regarding how the charge came to be filed. Those 
statements would, according to the District, further evidence 
that ASA had no objection to the subcontract and, therefore, 
would support its waiver defense. We agree with the Assistant 
Director's determination that ASA's motivation for filing the 
charge is immaterial to the defense of that charge. Therefore, 
we need not consider the District's argument that the Assistant 
Director misapplied our policy which prohibits the introduction 
of statements made during a conference.—7 
We have considered the District's miscellaneous arguments, 
which in many respects merely buttress the exceptions which we 
have discussed thus far. To whatever extent they are not 
specifically discussed herein, we deny them for the reasons 
stated by the Assistant Director. 
For the reasons set forth above, the District's exceptions 
are denied and the Assistant Director's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the District: 
1. Forthwith restore to the ASA unit the work performed by 
Banks prior to the 1989-90 school year. 
l^See Village of Endicott. 23 PERB ^3053 (1990). 
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Forthwith offer to Banks reinstatement to the position 
of cook-manager as it existed prior to her termination 
and make her whole for any loss of pay or benefits 
suffered as a result of the subcontracting of the unit 
work to QFM, with interest at the maximum legal rate, 
from the date of her termination until the date the 
unconditional offer of reinstatement is to be 
effective, less any interim earnings. 
Sign and post the attached notice at all locations 
normally used to post notices of information to members 
of the ASA unit. 
January 25, 1993 
Albany, New York 
f^cu],U A L I W U IK Pauline R. Kinsella^. Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric J.ySchmertz, Member 
\ 
APPENDIX 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES'- FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all'employees in the unit represented by the 
Administrative Supervisory Association (ASA) that the Gerraantown 
Central School District will: 
Forthwith restore to the ASA negotiating unit the work 
performed by Elaine Banks prior to the 1989-90 school 
year. 
Forthwith offer to Elaine Banks reinstatement to the 
position of cook-manager as it existed prior to her 
termination and make her whole for any loss of pay or 
benefits suffered as a result of the subcontracting of 
her unit work to QFM, with interest at the maximum 
legal rate, from the date of her termination until the 
date the unconditional offer of reinstatement is to be 
effective, less any interim earnings. 
Germantpwn .Ce.ntr.al. .School .'District 
Dated. By. (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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^ STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 100 0, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-12381 
COUNTY OF NASSAU, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (STEVEN A. CRAIN 
of counsel), for Charging Party 
BEE & EISMAN (PETER A. BEE and DANIEL E. WALL of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by both the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(CSEA) and the County of Nassau (County) to an Administrative Law 
Judge's (ALT) decision. 
CSEA has charged that the County violated §2 09-a.l(d) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally 
transferred the titles and budget codes of unit doctors and 
dentists from the County's correctional center to the County's 
medical center and thereby changed their wages and benefits. 
The ALJ dismissed the charge for lack of jurisdiction to the 
extent it alleged a unilateral change in certain benefits.-7 
The AKJ found that each of the benefits derived from provisions 
in the parties' contract such that the allegations in that 
-
7Holiday pay, Saturday overtime, standby pay, shift 
differential, and equipment allowance are the benefits in issue. 
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respect raised only arguable contract violations, which are 
outside our jurisdiction under §2 05.5(d) of the Act. He also 
dismissed for lack of proof an allegation that the County changed 
the doctors' and dentists' hours of work. The ALJ held, however, 
that thlT Cbuht;y^m^ 
when it ceased paying the doctors and dentists an hourly wage and 
placed them on an annual salary which paid them less than they 
made when they were paid at an hourly rate. 
CSEA alleges in its exceptions that its charge also 
complains about the decision to transfer the doctors' and 
dentists' correctional center titles and budget codes to the 
medical center. It argues that the change in titles and codes is 
itself predominantly related to the employees' terms and 
conditions of employment and is a mandatorily bargainable 
decision. CSEA does not except to the balance of the ALJ's 
decision and it supports the ALJ's jurisdictional finding 
regarding salary which is the subject of the County's exception. 
In that respect, the County argues that the ALJ should have also 
dismissed the salary change allegations for lack of jurisdiction 
because several sections of the contract, including section 25, 
captioned "Salaries", cover this aspect of the charge. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
We do not consider the titling and coding of the doctors' 
and dentists' positions within either the correctional center or 
U-12381 - Board -3 
the medical center to be itself a term and condition of their 
employment. That change appears merely to have shifted 
organizational responsibility for the titles and codes from the 
correctional center to the medical center. There was no change 
in theT doctors' or dentists'duties, work location ~~or 
supervision. Therefore, even if we were to consider the change 
to represent a paper transfer of employees between departments or 
agencies, we do not see any effect on the employees7 terms and 
conditions of employment except to the extent that the parties in 
this case may have agreed in section 44-1.1-7 of their contract 
to define eligibility for certain benefits by reference to those 
titles and codes. CSEA's argument that the titling and coding of 
the positions is mandatory because the parties chose to fix 
-''That section of the contract provides in relevant part as 
follows: 
All employees classified as full-time, but 
who work a reduced schedule and all 
Correctional Center Physicians, P.T., and all 
Correctional Center Dentists, P.T. shall 
receive all contract benefits to which full-
time employees are entitled, on a pro-rated 
basis. . . . 
As the ALJ's jurisdictional dismissal makes clear, however, 
the doctors and dentists are arguably entitled to the continued 
receipt of benefits under several other sections of the contract 
notwithstanding the change in position titling and coding. 
Therefore, it is not certain, as CSEA suggests in its brief, that 
the change in position titling and coding will cause the 
employees to lose any benefits. Without a loss of benefits, the 
underpinning for CSEA's negotiability argument is removed, an 
argument, we note, seemingly more intended to ensure that the 
employees retain contractual benefits and to enhance the 
likelihood of success on a contract grievance than anything else. 
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benefits by those titles and codes, however, would make any 
nonmandatory subject of negotiation mandatory if that subject 
somehow determined or affected contract benefit eligibility. 
Negotiability, however, must be determined by the nature of the 
subjectinr issue, notby how the parties have chosen to deal with 
the subject. The parties7 agreements cannot convert what is not 
a term and condition of employment into one.-7 
The violation found by the ALJ against the County rested 
upon the change from an hourly wage to an annual salary. The ALT 
held that there was nothing in the parties' contract which 
afforded the doctors and dentists a "reasonably arguable source 
of right"-7 to a particular method of compensation. Having 
examined the contract, we agree with the ALJ's finding. 
Therefore, the allegation is within our jurisdiction under 
§2 05.5(d) of the Act and we find that he properly rejected the 
County's jurisdictional defense in this respect. 
For the reasons set forth above, CSEA's and the County's 
exceptions are denied and the ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the County: 
1. Immediately restore the practice that existed prior to 
January 1, 1991 of paying doctors and dentists at the 
Nassau County Correctional Center an hourly wage. 
^Citv of Johnstown, 25 PERB 53085 (1992). 
-
7See, e.g. , County of Nassau, 23 PERB [^3051 (1990) . 
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Compensate doctors and dentists at the Nassau County 
Correctional Center for any base wages lost as the 
result of the unilateral change in the method of 
compensation, for the period January 1, 1991 to the 
date of the"restoration of""l^e-prl^r-pra^tice-^^"^^!!!^-
an hourly wage in accordance with paragraph 1 of this 
order, with interest on any sum owing at the maximum 
legal rate. 
Post the attached notice in all work locations 
ordinarily used to post written communications to unit 
employees. 
January 25, 1993 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe 
J6] 
*^^^C-&^ 
Eric J. Schmertz, Member 
APPENDIX 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify
 a n employees in the unit represented by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
that the County of Nassau will: 
Immediately restore the practice that 
existed prior to January 1, 1991 of paying 
doctors and dentists at the Nassau County 
Correctional Center an hourly wage. 
Compensate doctors and dentists at the 
Nassau County Correctional Center for any 
base wages lost as a result of the 
unilateral change in the method of 
compensation, for the period January 1, 
1991 to the date of the restoration of the 
prior practice of paying an hourly wage in 
accordance with paragraph 1 above, with 
interest on any sum owing at the maximum 
legal rate. 
County, of. Nassau 
Dated. By. (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CHENANGO FORKS TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
NYSUT, AFT, LOCAL #2 561, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-12363 
CHENANGO FORKS CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
BRIAN L. LAUD, for Charging Party 
GARRY A. LUKE, for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Chenango Forks Teachers Association, NYSUT, AFT, Local 
#2561 (Association) excepts to a decision by an Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ) which sustained in part and dismissed in part the 
Association's charge against the Chenango Forks Central School 
District (District). The Association alleges in its charge that 
the District violated §2 09-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it twice increased unilaterally the 
tuition charged nonresident unit teachers for their children to 
attend District schools and refused to negotiate the impact of 
the first increase pursuant to demand. 
The ALJ dismissed the unilateral change aspect of the charge 
regarding the 1990 tuition increase to $150.00 per year as 
untimely. He dismissed the allegations regarding the 1991 
increase to $250.00 per year because he concluded that the 
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tuition increase itself was not mandatorily negotiable. The ALJ 
held, however, that the District had refused improperly to 
bargain the impact of the first tuition increase pursuant to the 
Association's January 8, 1991 demand. 
The Association argues in its exceptions that the ALJ erred 
in dismissing on the merits the unilateral change aspect of the 
charge regarding the 1991 tuition increase. It argues also that 
the remedy ordered on the impact bargaining violation is 
inadeguate because the ALJ should have included a restoration of 
the 1990 tuition rate of $150.00 per year. The District has not 
filed a response to the Association's exceptions. 
Having reviewed the record and the Association's exceptions, 
we affirm the ALT's decision. 
The ALJ's dismissal of the timely unilateral change 
allegation reflects a correct interpretation of our decisions in 
two State of New York cases.-7 Those cases stand for the 
proposition that a decision which affects the public generally 
and employees only incidentally as members of that class is not 
mandatorily negotiable. The tuition paid by the nonresident unit 
employees is not uniquely required of them nor is the charge 
applied to them as employees. Rather, payment is required of all 
nonresidents of the school district and is only incidentally 
^13 PERB 53099 (1980) and 19 PERB J[3029 (1986) . In those cases, 
the Board analogized to a government which has operated a toll-
free bridge. The imposition of a toll or a subsequent increase 
affecting all users, including employees of the government, would 
not be subject to a bargaining duty as a condition to imposing or 
raising the tolls. 
Board - U-12363 -3 
required of the unit employees as members of that class. The 
District is not required to bargain with the Association about 
the decision to impose the tuition increase upon the unit 
employees. However, the Association is entitled to impact 
bargain with the District, such as for an exemption from the 
tuition increases or for a tuition decrease. This is not because 
the District had set the nonresident tuition rate unilaterally in 
the past, but because the tuition increase was directed uniformly 
to a class of the general public. 
To remedy the violation found on the District's refusal to 
bargain the impact of the first tuition increase, the AKT ordered 
only that the District bargain pursuant to the Association's 
demand. Contrary to the Association's contention, a recision of 
the tuition increase is not an appropriate remedy because the 
unilateral increase in tuition is not itself a violation of the 
Act. The remedy ordered by the ALJ is the appropriate one. 
For the reasons set forth above, the exceptions are denied 
and the ALJ's decision and order is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the District negotiate with 
the Association concerning the impact of the September 1990 
nonresident tuition increase upon unit employees' terms and 
conditions of employment and that it sign and post the attached 
Board - U-12 363 -4 
notice at all locations customarily used to post notices to unit 
employees. 
DATED: January 25, 1993 
Albany, New York 
fdC\ / rs&J 
Pauline R. Kinsella,Charrperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membeg: 
Eric Jj/Schmertz, Member 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE Tl PLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify
 t h ^ e m p l o y e e s o f t h e chenango Forks Central School 
District represented by the Chenango Forks Teachers Association, 
NYSUT, AFT, Local #2561 (Association), that the District will 
negotiate with the Association concerning the impact of the 
September 1990 nonresident tuition increase upon unit employees' 
terms and conditions of employment. 
.. Chenango .Forks Central- School- • District-
Dated . By. (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ULSTER COUNTY SHERIFF'S EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-13414 
COUNTY OF ULSTER, 
Respondent. 
THOMAS J. KRAJCI, for Charging Party 
MARK D. FRERING, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Ulster 
County Sheriff's Employees Association (Association) to a 
decision of the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director). On a stipulated record, the Director 
dismissed a charge in which the Association alleges that the 
County of Ulster (County) violated §209-a.l(a) and (d) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by failing to supply 
certain information to the Association which it had requested to 
prepare a defense in a disciplinary proceeding brought by the 
County against a unit employee pursuant to Civil Service Law 
(CSL) §75. 
Board - U-13414 -2 
In assessing the merits of the case, the Director relied on 
Board of Education, City School District of the City of 
Albany,-1 where the Board held: 
Generally stated, an employee organization may request, 
and is entitled to receive, information which is 
necessary f or~~th^—preparation.f oiT Collective 
negotiations, for example, number of job titles, salary 
schedules, and information for the administration of a 
contract including the investigation of grievances. In 
both cases, the obligation of the employer would be 
circumscribed by the rules of reasonableness, including 
the burden upon the employer to provide the 
information, the availability of the information 
elsewhere, the necessity therefor, the relevancy 
thereof and, finally, that the information supplied 
need not be in the form requested as long as it 
satisfies a demonstrated need.-7 
The Director found that the Association had not satisfied its 
burden of showing the necessity and relevance of the information 
it had requested. In a footnote to his decision, the Director 
opined that a showing of necessity and relevance may not be 
required if these elements are self-evident from the 
circumstances attendant to the request. Relying upon this 
footnote, the Association argues in its exceptions that the 
necessity and relevance of some of the information it had 
requested is, in fact, self-evident. The County disagrees, 
noting that the Director would have perceived these elements if 
they were self-evident. 
6 PERB ?[3012 (1973) 
Id. at 3030 
Board - U-13414 
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We need not consider whether the necessity and relevance of 
requested information can be established by the circumstances 
attendant to the request, or to whom these elements must be self-
evident, because we hold that there is no obligation under the 
Act to provide information concerning CSL §75 litigation. 
A union's entitlement to information under the Act derives 
from its right and obligation to represent unit employees in the 
negotiations for, and the administration of, collective 
bargaining agreements. Effective representation for such 
purposes requires access to necessary and relevant information. 
CSL §75 is a statutory procedure pursuant to which certain 
public employees are provided procedural due process prior to the 
implementation of disciplinary action. The CSL §75 procedures 
are separate and independent of the obligation to negotiate under 
the Act. While CSL §75 specifically affords an employee a right 
to representation by an attorney or a representative of a 
certified or recognized employee organization, such 
representation in that statutory proceeding is for purposes of 
litigation, not collective bargaining. Thus, we find that the 
entitlement to information in the context of a statutory 
proceeding such as CSL §75, if any, derives from the rights 
attendant to those proceedings, not the Act. Our analysis is 
unaffected by the reference to CSL §75 in the parties' contract 
because that reference does not convert the statutory CSL §75 
procedures into contractual obligations. Accordingly, we affirm 
Board - U-13414 
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the Director's decision that the Association's charge must be 
dismissed, but on the grounds set forth herein. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: January 25, 1993 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
^afefc.X 
Walter L. E i senbe rg , Member 
E r i c J / S c h m e r t z , Member 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
GOLD BADGE CLUB, LOCAL 1170, 
COMMUNICATION WORKERS OP AMERICA, 
Charging Party, 
-and^ CASE NO. U-12228 
TOWN OF GREECE, 
Respondent. 
ROBERT J. FLAVIN, for Charging Party 
BERNARD WINTERMAN, for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Gold Badge 
Club, Local 1170, Communication Workers of America (Club) to a 
decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). After hearing, 
the ALJ dismissed the Club's charge against the Town of Greece 
(Town) in which the Club alleges that the Town violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees7 Fair Employment Act (Act) 
when it refused to bargain the impact of a managerial decision 
involving the creation of a new position. The ALJ dismissed the 
charge because a duty to bargain the impact of a nonmandatory 
subject arises only on demand-'' and there was no evidence in the 
record that the Club had demanded negotiations. 
-^Citv of Rochester, 17 PERB [^3 082 (1984) ; Town of Oyster Bay, 
12 PERB 53086, aff 'a 12 PERB [^4510 (1979) . 
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In its exceptions, the Club admits that there is no evidence 
regarding an impact bargaining demand on the record before the 
ALJ, but seeks to offer evidence of a demand for us on this 
appeal. However, our review is limited to the record as it was 
developed"before"the ALJ7-7 The^ Club7 s alim^ i^ sioh^ tha-tr the 
record contains no evidence of an impact bargaining demand 
necessitates that the exceptions be denied and the ALJ's decision 
be affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: January 25, 1993 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, hairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
g/Marcrolin v. Newman. 130 A.D.2d 312, 20 PERB f7018 (3d Dep't 
1987), appeal dismissed. 71 N.Y.2d 844, 21 PERB [^7005 (1988); 
Civil Service Employees Ass'n, Inc. (Reese) , 25 PERB UI3012 
(1992); Manhasset Union Free School Dist.. 24 PERB f3003 (1991) 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF BUFFALO, 
Employer/Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-362 6 
BUFFALO PROFESSIONAL FIREFIGHTERS 
ASSOCIATION, INC., LOCAL 282, 
Intervenor. 
DAMON & MOREY (MELINDA G. DISARE and JOSEPH FERRARO 
of counsel), for Employer/Petitioner 
WYSSLING, SCHWAN & MONTGOMERY (W. JAMES SCHWAN of counsel), 
for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the City of 
Buffalo (City) to a decision by the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director). The City seeks to 
fragment supervisory titles from a fire fighter unit which now 
includes the supervisors and rank-and-file employees. That unit 
is represented by the Buffalo Professional Firefighters 
Association, Inc., Local 282 (Local 282), which opposes the 
City's petition. After a multi-day hearing, and on a detailed 
factual review of an extensive record, the Director, in a ninety-
one-page decision, fragmented three chiefs and one captain from 
the existing unit, but he otherwise dismissed the petition. In 
dismissing the petition, the Director determined that most of the 
supervisors did not exercise high-level supervisory authority and 
-2 '^ Board - C-3626 
that the record did not otherwise establish a conflict of 
interest, a subversion of supervisory authority or inadequate 
representation of the supervisors' interests by Local 282. 
The City has appealed essentially every determination 
adverseL toL itsL interest3 • Most of the c ^ 
the legal standards applied by the Director, but it also appeals 
from certain evidentiary rulings made by the Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) who conducted the hearing as the Director's designee 
and certain of the Director's findings of fact. Local 282 merely 
argues in its brief response that the Director's decision is 
supported by the record and represents the correct disposition of 
the petition on the facts and law. 
Although we affirm the Director's decision, the number, 
nature and detail of the City's exceptions do not warrant a 
summary disposition. Therefore, we will respond to the City's 
main exceptions, but with as much brevity as the circumstances of 
the appeal reasonably permit. 
The City first argues that by not taking evidence of the 
command officers' allegedly separate community of interest, the 
Director disregarded §207.1(a) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act), which requires a consideration of the 
community of interest among employees in defining the most 
appropriate unit. 
) 
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Since Town of Smithtown,-7 we have made it clear that our 
consideration of community of interest is and must be different 
under a petition to fragment an existing unit than it is under a 
petition for initial uniting of unrepresented employees. 
Community of interest is considered under both types of 
petitions, but, in the context of a fragmentation petition, it is 
the absence of conflict within a long-standing unit which 
establishes a community of interest sufficient to preserve an 
existing unit. In the absence of a conflict of interest, 
whatever real or perceived differences there may be in working 
conditions, goals or concerns among subgroups of unit employees 
are not enough to overcome that shared community of interest. 
The Director's decision, and the ALJ's ruling he confirmed, do 
not disregard the community of interest criterion as we have 
defined and applied it in the fragmentation context. 
Moreover, we note that the record contains much evidence 
regarding a separate supervisory community of interest. In that 
respect, we know, for example, that there is a fraternal 
organization-'' of command officers which meets to discuss 
matters of mutual concern to the supervisors. The Director's 
decision refers to several matters involving that organization. 
The proffered information regarding the particular subject 
•±'8 PERB 53015 (1975) . 
2/The Director denied the officers association's motion to 
intervene in the case because it is not an employee organization. 
It had moved to intervene in opposition to the City's petition. 
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matters under discussion at meetings of the officers association 
added nothing material to the alleged conflicts with the rank-
and-file employees and would have been largely cumulative to an 
otherwise lengthy record. As such, we find no prejudice to the 
_C_ity.in "Uie^pire^ 
detailing the specific work-related matters discussed during 
meetings of the command officers. 
The City next argues that the Director misapplied our case 
law by placing a burden on the City to establish "by compelling 
evidence" grounds to warrant fragmentation. The City argues that 
whatever the bases for fragmentation, they need not be 
established by compelling evidence. 
We read the Director's decision, however, to require only 
proof of a compelling need to fragment as established, for 
example, by conflicts of interest, inadequate representation or 
subversion of supervisory authority. Based upon our review of 
his decision, we find that the Director applied the burden of 
proof advocated by the City which correctly cites our decision in 
County of Erie and Erie County Sheriff for the applicable 
standard of review.-f 
The Director is also alleged to have erroneously disregarded 
any evidence of potential subversion of supervisory authority or 
potential conflict. In this respect, the City appears to argue 
5/22 PERB 53055 (1989), in which we stated that a long-standing 
existing unit will not be fragmented unless there is demonstrated 
a "compelling need" to do so. 
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that the Director erroneously required compelling proof that the 
alleged subversion of supervisory authority was both intentional 
and successful and consisted of actual direct threats by Local 
282 to the supervisors. Having reviewed the Director's decision 
and the record^ however, we do not find that the Director 
incorrectly limited the City's proof or that his discussion was 
inconsistent with any of our decisions regarding subversion of 
supervisory authority.-7 
The City's next several exceptions, and, to an extent, the 
exception discussed supra, involve the Director's disposition of 
its allegations that Local 282 had subverted the supervisors' 
authority to a degree necessary to cause their fragmentation from 
the existing unit. 
With respect to this alleged subversion, the City first 
argues that having fragmented Captain Thomas Bouquard on a 
finding that Local 282 had subverted his authority by bringing 
internal union charges against him, all of the supervisors should 
have been fragmented under our decision in East Greenbush Central 
School District.-7 In that case, we fragmented all supervisors 
from a unit including rank-and-file employees because the union 
president had attempted to pressure one supervisor during a 
conversation to change his supervisory style and practices. We 
considered this conversation to have been intended by the union 
-
7See, e.g., East Greenbush Cent. School Dist., 17 PERB 5[3 083 
(1984); Citv of White Plains, 16 PERB 5(3096 (1983). 
^
717 PERB 5[3083 (1984) . 
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to serve as a warning to all supervisors that they must gear the 
exercise of their supervisory responsibilities to the union's 
wishes. 
We do not similarly consider Bouquard's exclusion from the 
unit to warrant or necessitate the fragmentation of all of the 
supervisors in the unit. Local 282's charges against Bouquard, 
in relevant part, stemmed from his investigation of a theft of a 
wallet and was narrowly limited to his duties in the newly-
created internal affairs department. It did not involve a 
supervisor/subordinate relationship. The record shows that 
Local 282 was questioning the scope of Bouquard's duties as an 
internal affairs department officer and contesting his authority 
to order employees to undergo polygraph examinations. Therefore, 
the internal union charges preferred against him would not 
reasonably be seen by other supervisors, who are not similarly 
situated, as a general warning that their supervisory 
responsibilities may only be conducted at risk to their 
membership in Local 2 82. 
The City next excepts to the Director's decision that 
several incidents did not evidence a subversion of supervisory 
authority. These incidents, involving hazardous materials 
response teams, Local 282's encouragement to unit employees not 
to work out-of-title, a dispute relating to the acquisition of 
amphibious firefighting equipment, litigation involving a civil 
service promotional list which might adversely affect some of the 
supervisors, and Local 282's advice to union members to request 
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representation whenever dealing with Bouquard and the internal 
affairs department, are detailed at great length in the 
Director's decision. We do not repeat the Director's findings of 
fact in those respects because the exceptions center around the 
conclusions which are properly drawn from his description of 
those incidents. 
With respect to each of these incidents, the City alleges 
generally that Local 282 interfered in the implementation of the 
City's plans or failed to cooperate with them. The Director's 
basic response to each was that Local 282 was acting legitimately 
to protect the statutory and contract rights of its members and 
its activities did not subvert the supervisors' authority as 
supervisors. We find that the Director's description fairly and 
accurately summarizes the record and that his conclusions 
properly reflect that record. 
Implicit in the City's subversion arguments arising from 
these several incidents is an assumption that all of its 
supervisors owe it an undivided loyalty and total commitment to 
its programs and policies. But as long as supervisors are 
eligible for representation, they will have rights and interests 
as employees. A union which represents them properly within its 
statutory rights and duties as the bargaining agent does not risk 
fragmentation of its unit on a subversion theory. To expose a 
union to fragmentation of its unit on that basis would tend to 
chill the union's representation of employees' interests, which 
Board - C-3626 -8 
itself might create a basis for possible fragmentation on the 
ground that the union inadequately represented those employees. 
That Hobson's choice is not one a union is compelled to make. 
The City next argues that the level of supervisory authority 
alone is sufficient to fragment all of the titles sought by the 
City. The Director fragmented the chief of communications, the 
chief of fire prevention and the chief of training on this basis. 
He specifically distinguished all other supervisors, including 
the superintendent of fire apparatus, the superintendent of fire 
alarm and the assistant superintendent of fire alarm. This 
result, the City argues, is inconsistent with the Director's 
decision in City of Niagara Falls,-7 a decision which was not 
appealed to us. In that case, the Director excluded fire 
captains and battalion chiefs on a finding that they exercised 
sufficient supervisory responsibility to warrant their 
fragmentation. 
After comparing the Director's decision in Niagara Falls 
with.his decision in this case, we do not find them to be 
inconsistent. The level of command responsibility in the two 
cases is not the same. Moreover, we do not agree with that 
decision to the extent it is inconsistent with our subsequent 
decision in City of Schenectady.-7 In that case, we declined to 
^12 PERB f4032 (1979). The City also cites to the Director's 
decisions in City of New Rochelle, 9 PERB ^4012 (1976), Hartsdale 
Fire Dist., 10 PERB fl4006 (1977), and Greenville Fire Dist., 
6 PERB 5[4041 (1973), in support of its argument in this respect. 
z/19 PERB 13027 (1986), aff'g 18 PERB ?[4083 (1985). 
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fragment police captains and lieutenants on a finding that they 
did not exercise a high level of supervision. Their authority 
was restricted by established procedures, policies and contract 
and was subject to review by higher level supervisors. As we 
view this record, the level of command responsibility for the 
supervisors who were not fragmented in this case is similar to 
that in City of Schenectady. The high level of supervision which 
might warrant fragmentation is exercised in this case by those 
supervisors who are presently excluded from the unit or those who 
were fragmented by the Director's decision. 
The City also argues that the Director's decision did not 
take into account the totality of circumstances as required by 
Uniondale Union Free School District.^ We disagree. The 
Director did not ignore or distort the "big picture", as alleged 
by the City. He merely disagreed with the City's view and 
interpretation of that picture in a manner consistent with the 
record and our decisions. 
The City's remaining exceptions are to certain rulings by 
the ALJ under which the ALJ allegedly either incorrectly included 
or excluded certain evidence and to certain miscellaneous 
findings of fact made by the Director. We have considered the 
City's arguments in these respects and conclude that the rulings 
and findings were either correct, reserved to the ALJ's or 
2'21 PERB 5[3060 (1988) . 
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Director's discretion, or would not have affected the outcome of 
our decision. 
For the reasons set forth above, the City's exceptions are 
denied and the Director's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the following are fragmented 
from the unit represented by Local 282: chief of communications, 
chief of training, chief of fire prevention, and captain assigned 
to internal affairs. In all other respects, the petition is 
dismissed. 
DATED: January 25, 1993 
Albany, New York 
L=^L JSML-
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter(L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric J ./Schmertz , Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 827, 
MADISON COUNTY UNIT, 
Charging Party, 
and- CASE NO. U^-12566 
STOCKBRIDGE VALLEY CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (PAUL S. BAMBERGER of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
HANCOCK & ESTABROOK (RENEE L. JAMES of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions of the Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Local 827, Madison County Unit (CSEA) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in which the ALJ dismissed a 
charge filed by CSEA against the Stockbridge Valley Central 
School District (District). The charge alleges improper 
motivation for the District's termination of Laurence Keenan, 
president of CSEA's unit of noninstructional employees, in 
violation of §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act). The ALJ dismissed CSEA's charge, after a 
hearing, concluding that it had failed to prove a causal 
Board - U-12566 
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relationship between Keenan's protected activities and his 
termination. 
CSEA argues in its exceptions that it met its burden of 
proof and, because the District has failed to rebut that proof 
persuasively, we must find a violation of the Act as alleged. 
The District has filed a response to the exceptions supporting 
the AKJ's decision. 
In City of Salamanca,-7 we outlined the respective burdens 
in cases involving allegedly improperly motivated actions: 
In order to establish such improper 
motivation, a charging party must prove that 
he had been engaged in protected activities, 
and that the respondent had knowledge of and 
acted because of those activities. [Footnote 
) omitted] If the charging party proves a 
prima facie case of improper motivation, the 
burden of persuasion shifts to the respondent 
to establish that its actions were motivated 
by legitimate business reasons. [Footnote 
omitted]-7 
In Town of Independence,^7 we reiterated the standard, adding 
that union animus "may be established by statements or by 
circumstantial evidence, which may be rebutted by presentation of 
legitimate business reasons for the action taken, unless found to 
be pretextual. "-7 In City of Utica.-7 we noted that the 
i718 PERB 5(3012 (1985) . 
g7Id. at 3 027. 
^
723 PERB 53020 (1990) . 
^
7Id. at 3038. 
^
724 PERB 5[3044 (1991) . 
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pretextual nature of the employer's articulated reasons for its 
conduct not only rebuts a claim of legitimate business reasons, 
but may support the charging party's prima facie case. 
Despite Keenan's union office and his participation in 
arguably protected activities, and certain inconsistencies in the 
testimony of Dr. Edward Reid, Superintendent of Schools, who 
recommended Keenan's termination, the ALT concluded that Reid's 
belief that Keenan had tampered with a bus tachograph-'' caused 
him to recommend Keenan's termination, not any anti-union animus. 
As such, the AKT concluded that CSEA had not established a causal 
connection between Keenan's protected activities and Reid's 
actions. She found also no evidence of animus toward, or 
disparate treatment of, Keenan's protected activities. 
Having reviewed the record, we find no basis to disturb 
these findings regarding animus, disparate treatment or motive. 
Absent persuasive evidence of animus toward, or disparate 
treatment because of, Keenan's protected activities, and in view 
of Reid's belief, found to be credible by the ALT, in the merits 
of his action, the decision of the ALT must be affirmed. In 
reaching this conclusion, we have considered the balance of 
CSEA's exceptions, and find them insufficient to warrant a 
contrary disposition. 
For the reasons set forth above, CSEA's exceptions are 
denied and the ALT's decision is affirmed. 
-'A tachograph prints out the speed of a bus while in operation. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: January 25, 1993 
Albany, New York 
iA^^lQ^rX^V 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe' 
Enc/J. Schmertz, Member 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BAY SHORE TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, CASE NO. D-0251 
Respondent, 
upon the Charge of Violation of 
§-2-l-0-rl- oftheCivil ServiceLaw 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On October 5, 1992, Ernest F. Hart, this agency's Counsel, 
filed a charge alleging that the Bay Shore Classroom Teachers 
Association (Respondent) had violated Civil Service Law (CSL) 
§210.1 in that it caused, instigated, encouraged, condoned and 
engaged in a strike against the Bay Shore Union Free School 
District (District) on May 6, 1992.-' The charge further 
alleges that 295 of the 340 members of the Respondent were absent 
from work without authorization.-7 
The Respondent requested Counsel to indicate the penalty he 
would be willing to recommend to this Board as appropriate for 
the violation charged. Respondent proposed to withdraw its 
answer, and thereby admit the factual allegations of the charge, 
on the understanding that Counsel would recommend and this Board 
-' As filed, the charge contains an allegation that an illegal 
strike also occurred on March 12, 1992. This specification 
was subsequently withdrawn by Counsel. 
-
1
 The District's complaint, which gave rise to this charge, 
advises that there are 340 employees in the Respondent's 
bargaining unit. 
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would accept, a penalty of loss of Respondent's right to have 
dues and agency shop fees deducted for a period of three 
months, commencing on the first practicable date following the 
issuance of this decision.-7 Counsel has so recommended. 
On the basis of the unanswered charge, we find that the 
Respondentviolatedest §210^1—in—that—it—engagedin—astrike as— 
charged, and we determine that the recommended penalty is a 
reasonable one and will effectuate the policies of the Act. 
WE ORDER that the dues and agency shop fee deduction rights 
of the Bay Shore Classroom Teachers Association be suspended, 
commencing on the first practicable date following the issuance 
of this decision, and continuing for such period of time during 
which twenty-five percent (25%) of its annual agency shop fees, 
if any, and dues which would otherwise be deducted. Thereafter 
no dues or agency shop fees shall be deducted on its behalf by 
the Bay Shore Union Free School District until the Respondent 
affirms that it no longer asserts the right to strike against any 
government as required by the provisions of CSt §210.3(g). 
DATED: January 25, 1993 
Albany, New York 
A ^ J.^^.L^l^ 
Pau3/ine R. K m s e l l a , Cha i rperson 
Walter t . E i senberg , Member 
3/ 
t/^tsU^ 
Eric CK Schmertz, Member 
The District advises that annual dues are deducted over 
twenty pay periods because almost all unit employees receive 
no paychecks during the summer vacation months. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 182, 
Petitioner, 
and CASE NO^ C-4000 
TOWN OF FORESTPORT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
') above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 182 has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: Highway Department Employees. 
j Excluded: All others. 
Certification - C-4000 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local 182. The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to 
wages^hoursy and other terms and conditions of—employment^ or—~— 
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: January 25, 1993 
Albany, New York 
JJL. 1Q. JH 
Pauline R. Kinsella,'Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric/J. Schmertz, Memfefer 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, 
LOCAL 200B, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4006 
UNION SPRINGS CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Service Employees 
International Union, Local 200B has been designated and selected 
by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: School Nurse (Registered Professional Nurse), 
Bookkeeping Machine Operator, Teacher 
Assistant, Teacher Aide, Typist, Senior 
Stenographer and Stenographer. 
Certification - C-4006 - 2 -
Excluded: Secretary to the Superintendent of Schools, 
Secretary to the Business Administrator, Senior 
Account Clerk/District Treasurer and all other 
employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Service Employees 
International Union, Local 200B. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: January 25, 1993 
Albany, New York 
Paul'ine R. Kinsella, Chai rperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric Jj/Schmertz, Membe 
